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“theories” (approaches, themes, theses, programs, methods, etc.), the changes in the sciences during this
period contrasted sharply with the changes in the humanities. Part 2 discusses in detail how these two social
transformations affected the histories of music theory and cognitive music theory. The former fractiously
withdrew from its parent organization (AMS), whereas the latter was welcomed into SMPC. Inasmuch as
both music theory and cognitive music theory rely on maps and models, Part 3 examines the metatheoretical
importance of these terms for music cognition, music theory, and cognitive music theory. Part 4 speculates
about the future—how music cognition, cognitive music theory, and music theory contribute to the structure
of musical knowledge. The intellectual potential of this unique triadic collaboration is discussed: psychology
provides a commanding empirical framework of the human mind, while music theory and cognitive music
theory logically model moment-to-moment temporal emotions and the auditory intellections at the core of
musical art.
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1 briefly recounts the influence of social unrest
and the explosion of knowledge in both psychology and
the humanities circa 1970-1990. As the sciences rely on
explicit top-down theories connected to bottom-up maps
and models, and whereas the humanities build on
bottom-up differences within malleable top-down “theories” (approaches, themes, theses, programs, methods, etc.),
the changes in the sciences during this period contrasted
sharply with the changes in the humanities. Part 2 discusses
in detail how these two social transformations affected the
histories of music theory and cognitive music theory. The
former fractiously withdrew from its parent organization
(AMS), whereas the latter was welcomed into SMPC.
Inasmuch as both music theory and cognitive music theory
rely on maps and models, Part 3 examines the metatheoretical importance of these terms for music cognition,
music theory, and cognitive music theory. Part 4 speculates
about the future—how music cognition, cognitive music
theory, and music theory contribute to the structure of
musical knowledge. The intellectual potential of this
unique triadic collaboration is discussed: psychology provides a commanding empirical framework of the human
mind, while music theory and cognitive music theory logically model moment-to-moment temporal emotions and
the auditory intellections at the core of musical art.
part
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Part 1
Introduction

O

n the occasion of Tirovolas and Levitin’s research
survey of Music Perception from 1983 to 2010
(this issue), it seems appropriate to recount the
historical, cultural, and philosophical contexts that shaped
Music Perception volume 29,

issue

1,

pp .

1–21.

issn

0730-7829,

electronic issn

the rise of music cognition and cognitive music theory in
the United States. I begin shortly after the Vietnam War.
Following the social divisiveness of the war (when many,
including the present author, were in graduate school),
radical changes occurred in almost every corner of modern life (e.g., the women’s movement, civil rights, jurisprudence, post-colonialism, etc.).
A competing transformation in the 1970s was the
growth of new knowledge and the establishment of new
fields, which expanded the size of university faculties.
During this development, college and university faculties
became more professionalized. For those wanting to
teach at the college level, doctorate degrees were the new
reality, and to earn tenure, publication at many universities and colleges became mandatory. All this created
pressure for more venues of publication. The emergence
of music cognition (and its flagship journal Music
Perception) was an outcome of all this (to which I shall
return).
Recent Ph.D.’s may regard my selected time frame as
ancient history (occurring well before they were born).
But both young and old should not forget the power that
music exhibited during that turmoil, for it became a favored medium of rebellion and protest (e.g., “We Shall
Overcome” during the civil rights movement and Bob
Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the Wind” during political protests).
Throughout this period, music showed its power by
uniting people who had similar moral, political, and economic values and who were against the war, against current authority, and in favor of radically rebuilding the
worldwide social structure. More so than any of the
other arts, music created a sense of solidarity. It achieved
this partly because mass culture via the simultaneous
emergence of wide-reaching modes of electronic communication (AM/FM radio, satellite television, video
tapes, LPs, multi-track recordings, etc.) efficiently delivered music for like-minded consumerists, regardless of
geographical location.
The burgeoning multiplicity of types of listeners represented every economic, racial, gendered, and cultural
level of society, including, of course, those who favored
the war. Society saw a rapid rise of counter-cultural
diversity in the proliferation of pop, folk, jazz, rock,
1533-8312. © 2011
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gospel, country-western, and ethnic music, something
that is still with us today. Yet there remained, of course,
a commitment to the institutionalized traditions of symphony, chamber music, opera, ballet, and the Broadway
musical.
In higher education a consequence of targeted-listener
demography was that both psychology and academic
departments of music began to acknowledge music as a
cultural, social, economic, and emotional force to be
reckoned with. In other words, a social and academic
revolution also took place regarding the way music was
conceptually valorized. All music—whether “low” or
“high”—was now worthy of collegiate study along with
the European classical music of the past.
With the war draft and the burst of new ideas, the
number of undergraduate and graduate students wanting higher degrees increased. And a new kind of student,
unschooled in classical musical traditions and interested
mostly in the music of his or her social demographic,
began to arrive on campus. Thus, shifts in the musical
curriculum became inevitable. As diversity was now valued, the study of popular culture, cultural history, ethnography, and music anthropology came to populate the
course lists of universities and colleges across the country. At the forefront of this change stood postmodernism, offering new methods for conceptualizing culture,
identifying new subjects and areas for music research,
and generally transforming how music was to be understood. From the new wave of students, those who qualified for the doctorate entered the professoriate and
permanently changed the face of music study.
Postmodernism

After the war, the wave of radical anti-authoritarianism
in the humanities morphed into what emerged in the
1960s in the vernacular juxtapositions of postmodernist art. The critique of the modern versus the postmodern was carried forward by the rise of literary theory in
the 1970s and then applied to epistemology by a prolific group of French philosophers in the late 1980s
(Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and
others).
Today, in some quarters scholars would say that we
have now moved past postmodernism to an anti-postmodernism environment. Indeed, in the mid to late
1990s humanistic scholarship began to shift closer to the
social sciences—to cultural history, cultural anthropology, political theory, and the like. Other humanists during this period retrenched to the writing of traditional
history, but with an increased sensitivity toward the multiplicity of voices within a given culture and a correlated

reluctance to think in terms of theoretical generalizations.
Because the postmodern movement had an important
impact on the interpretation of knowledge not only in
the humanities but also in the sciences (to be explained),
we must discuss it briefly and sketch out a few of its attributes inasmuch as, even after a fairly short reign
(roughly one generation), the residue of this ideology
lingers on, permeating many current beliefs and practices in both fields. In what follows below, I will list some
of the core beliefs and propositions.
Postmodernism’s modus operandi was reflexive and
hermeneutic. It attempted to construct and deconstruct
written narratives (discourses, dialectics) about reality
rather than to settle for the reality derived from empirical research. In its most conservative, purest form, it
embraced interpretation while suppressing the analysis
of facts, and favored personal understanding while holding general explanation suspect—this because reductionism marginalized difference, an important issue to
postmodernists.
Psychologists would regard the term postmodernism as
a “fuzzy” category of general-knowledge (GK) (Medin
& Barsalou, 1987) with multiple, sometimes contradictory, strands. Defining the term is thus out of the question. As an ideology without boundaries, postmodernism
therefore does not proscribe how postmodernists go
about their research programs. Some scholars adopted
postmodernism in a pragmatic, fluid, and nuanced way.
Others have been less flexible, even dogmatic and doctrinaire, claiming, for example, that “all, or nearly all,
aspects of human psychology are completely socially
determined” (see Duignan’s overview, 2011). In other
words, to this latter group, behavioral science was just
one narrative among many in the “game of language”
(see Patton’s overview, 2001).
Although these statements may seem absurd to the
readers of this journal, the postmodernist’s philosophy
was respect and tolerance—for the irreducible, for signifying, non-dialectical differentiation, for local variation, and for heterogeneously incommensurate values
(the literature on postmodernism is immense; for general overviews, the reader may consult Duignan, 2011;
McGowan, 2005; Patton, 2001; for uses of the word in
musicology, see Williams, 2000, and the numerous essays
in Lochhead & Auner, 2002). Validity of experience per
se could thus be trusted (though without “foundational”
status), provided postmodernist scholars demonstrated
self-awareness in their research by confessing their “situatedness” (and thus potential bias) with respect to a chosen text, dialectic, narrative, or what have you. Hence,
unlike the sciences, postmodernist writings are full of
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biographical asides and personal introspection. Such
egoism is perhaps not surprising, given the movement’s
focus on difference.
The postmodernist emphasis on deconstructing written discourse confronted not just the semantic
self-reference of written language but also the multivariate contexts of signifying images, icons, and other
non-verbal imaginative phenomena (e.g., music and
dance). They insisted that in language, word meanings
functioned as parts of other word meanings in an infinitely reflexive regression (or in a bracketed arbitrariness). No words were concrete; all required interpretation.
But within a given historical moment this enabled
research to furnish a more or less accurate knowledge,
one that was pragmatically useful if only of limited truth.
(For today’s humanists, the test for knowledge production is how well any approach, theme, thesis, program,
method, etc., accurately and interpretively elucidates a
chosen social discourse. This is notably different from
the sciences where theories attempt mathematically or
logically to model or map natural phenomena.)
Postmodernists were suspicious of any kind of centrism, essentialism, elitism, or high-level metatheory that
suppressed nonconformist thought. Ironically, in its heyday postmodernism itself became the kind of grand
metanarrative that it disparaged. That is, for all its protestations against past ideologies, postmodernism became just one more ideology among many, and in many
cases was just as domineering and conservative as, say,
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment or German
Idealism (Kant, Hegel) that it vilified.
In any event, like all humanists, postmodernists elevated the notion of qualification to the nth degree.
Intellectually, the movement institutionalized a kind of
existential skepticism toward any kind of ideology (but
too rarely skeptical of its own ideology). Its adherents
claimed that all knowledge (including that gleaned from
scientific techniques) was relative and historicized because human agents always construct knowledge in compliance with current social practices and beliefs, which
change over time. (Relative though knowledge may be,
it cannot be gainsaid that both civilization and biological
survivability strongly argue that human beings have for
a very long time known quite a lot about the world,
though not the elitist knowledge derived from scholarly
pursuits.)
The interpretive vocabulary of postmodernism was
replete with adjectives such as ideological, perspectival,
situated, immanent, privileged, problematized, provisional, phenomenological, subjective, approximate, contextualized, intertextualized, imbricated, mutable,
speculative, qualifiable, and contingent. Postmodernist
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scholarly discourse placed a high value on heterogeneous
and multiply textured interpretations along with a keen
interest in the power relations that bolstered a given cultural ideology.
Many postmodernists were wary of interpretations
that relied on scientific vocabularies—words such as
axioms, constants, unity, generalities, equivalence, cyclicity, veridicality, laws, rules, universals, reductionism,
causation, prediction, probability, objectivity, independent reality, certainty (binding implication), verified and
falsified evidence, logical formalism, determinism, closed
systems, foundational or holistic knowledge, truth,
quantifiability, normative behavior, and the like. Instead,
postmodernist “perspectivism” insisted that knowledge
was necessarily a social construct (Kuhn, 1962) and that
scientific reality was never totally objective (Gieryn,
1999). (But again, to find out what science is about,
physical and biological facts, however conceived, have to
be part of the cultural discourse within the languages of
mathematics and symbolic logic.)
In sum, postmodernism was the academic discipline
that made the case for idiostructuration—for difference
and oneness (undefined by comparison to contextual
similarity), for personal and group individuality, and for
the value of sheer uniqueness. This is its legacy, although
like all ideologies it overreached (particularly in its antiscience posturing).
The Decline of Humanistic Positivism

During the 70s and 80s, postmodernists largely brushed
aside older disciplines in musicology, such as archival
and manuscript research, primary source studies, and
any kind of data collecting for its own sake inasmuch as
isolated facts were suspect. According to them, the
methodology of such philological practices was driven
by a “positivist” mentality (a charge leveled by Kerman,
1985).
Over several generations, however, these so-called
positivists had rediscovered and deciphered early music
and then transcribed it into modern and reliable scholarly and performing editions. In so doing, they had bequeathed a lasting legacy not just to the field but to the
art of early music. But by concentrating on the verification and falsification of source facts, postmodernists
denigrated positivistic methodologies because they were,
so it was said, theoretically impoverished, overlooking
the relativistic and cultural nature of humanistic knowledge. As we have seen, texts engendered multiple interpretations, and notated scores were no different.
According to postmodernist sensibility, the “closed”
research of positivism rarely came to grips with the
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culturally “open,” social meaning of the music. The
charge was that the methods of scholarly positivism
would never be capable of dealing with the true nature
of musicological subject matter because text and authenticity were contradictory concepts.
Postmodernists also regarded stand-alone score analysis as just another form of positivism, which called for
new kinds of historical and cultural approaches to music
theory. But those committed to theory and analysis were
unconvinced of postmodernist doctrine, and most held
their ground. This decision had, as we shall see, a significant outcome in music theory and analysis.
Literary Theory and Postmodern Musicology

Eschewing the disciplines and methodologies established by music positivism, the “new musicology” had
to find new rules of scholarly behavior and, in general,
looked to literary criticism and cultural theory for its
models. If positivists and postmodernists shared any
common ground, it was that both believed in musical
styles as languages and scores as texts. So literary theory
appeared to be an appropriate model for what was
called the “new musicology.”
Theory in the humanities means any kind of more or
less fixed and hypothetically identifiable top-down approach to a text or a score, where the target of the literary
or musical analysis is mapped onto the phenomenon in
accordance with the chosen approach. The difference
between the sciences and the humanities is obviously
that in the latter there are no replicated experimental
tests of the various hypothetical approaches. This is because the subject matter of arts and letters is unique, and
so humanists respect the bottom-up, idiostructural quality of written phenomena (whether text or score) even
if the internal analytical mapping violates the external
top-down approach (i.e., transgresses the boundary of
the selected “theory”).
Hence, in the humanities, “anomalous” analytical
uniqueness is frequently valued more than the general
integrity and consistency of the approach because individuality is regarded as essential to the meaning of the
humanistic phenomenon being analyzed. Humanistic
theory is thus not paradigmatic because analytical mappings are always shifting the top-down grounds preselected to generate the analysis (sometimes the grounds
are ignored altogether in favor of the originality of the
work or of the intellectual promise of an atypical mapping). In other words, the analysis need not be isomorphic to the chosen approach (to the “theory”).
Free-wheeling analyses without explicit theoretical commitments are thus not unusual in the humanities (e.g.,
in essays and journalistic pieces).

The positivistic literary criticism of the 1930s and 40s
was on the wane in the 1950s, and by the 1960s literary
theory was in the ascendant. From 1960 onward one witnessed endless turnovers in literary theory—from critical theory and literary history to semiotics, narratology,
Marxism (commodification), structuralism, reactive deconstruction, psychoanalytical approaches (Freudian,
Lacanian), myth criticism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, reader-response theory (which had
a psychological component), feminist criticism, black
aesthetics, neo-Marxism, and leftist politics (Leitch,
1988).
Cycling through all the various approaches was remarkable (many monists adopted one approach for their
entire career). As said, these approaches are, from a scientific point of view, not theories but mappings or models without explicit goals of theoretical unity. This is not
to say there is no attempt at theoretical codification—
narratology, which comes from structuralism, is a very
well developed literary theory (see Prince’s 1967/2003
dictionary), as is semiotics (musical semiotics has clear
mappings and an analytical symbology to go with them;
see, e.g., Nattiez, 1990). Because the literary terrain is so
varied and complex, one frequently must use many maps
to arrive at a critical explanation of a given text, whether
a poem or a score, inasmuch as textual meaning always
remains culturally and historically contingent.
The important point is that throughout the 1970s, 80s,
and 90s these “theories,” themes, motifs, programs of
research, approaches, mappings, models, and what have
you were imported and freely appliquéd onto the postmodern studies of music history and culture.
To respond to these new ways of thinking, a rush of
new publications occurred in the arts and letters (e.g.,
New Literary History, 1970; Critical Inquiry, 1977), and
this was no less true in musicology (e.g., Journal of
Musicology, 1981). As elsewhere, various fields in music
were carved up into subfields with specialized interests
(e.g., 19th Century Music, 1977; Computer Music Journal,
1977; Black Music Research Journal, 1980; American
Music, 1983).
As time wore on, the structuralism that typified earlier
literary and music criticism thus yielded to the poststructuralism of certain postmodernists. Many new subjects found a place in the curriculum, and conflicts
between “old” and “new” ways culminated in what came
to be called the “cultural wars” (positivism vs. postmodernism). These disagreements paralleled the “linguistics
wars” (the polarization between transformational grammars and transformational semantics; see Harris, 1993)
and the “science wars” (postmodernist tenets vs. the nature of science; see Gieryn, 1999). All three conflicts
dominated the humanities, the social sciences, and the
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sciences even into the late 1990s. Although tempers have
cooled, the scars are still present. The question is, was all
the polemic necessary?
Science and Psychology

If postmodernism foregrounded human difference per
se, then human science in the form of psychology takes
precisely the opposite tack, by seeking out the commonality and cross-cultural universals between individually different social groups—between novices and
sophisticates, savants and normals, and so forth.
In science, change is motivated by a belief in incremental progress abetted by the unending analysis of experimental data. Top-down theories are strongly integrated
with their bottom-up models and mappings, and these
require the latter to stay within the confines laid down by
the theory. The lingering anti-authoritarianism in the humanities and the strong desire to reject the received wisdom (which seemed unwise to many) was thus not nearly
so pronounced in the sciences, which as an intellectual
domain, has traditionally been less impacted by social
change than the humanities or the social sciences. This is
because normal science relies on “paradigms,” where
change results from accumulated anomalies that eventually topple or suddenly dethrone a current theory (Kuhn,
1962), relegating a once accepted practice to the status of
an historical artifact. Such shifts perhaps depend less on
social revolutions, which are motivated by metaphysical
beliefs, than on confronting an accumulation of unsupportable data. So postmodernism had a limited effect on
the “hard” sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics).
However, it invaded the “soft” social sciences (cultural
anthropology, sociology, political science, and economics) and social psychology. This is because the bottom-up
mappings and models used in the soft social sciences are
less tied to their theoretical structures, which is to say, in
the soft social sciences a lot of modeling and mapping
takes place without obedience to explicitly or implicitly
fixed theories. So what happened in the “soft” social sciences roughly paralleled what went on in the humanities;
hence, postmodernism—following the social upheaval
after the Vietnam War—played a greater role in these
disciplines. In contrast, the “hard” social sciences more
closely resembled the “hard” sciences and so remained
somewhat immune from postmodernism (space does
not permit examples from the social sciences).
Also less affected were “hard” psychological research
areas (psychophysics, perception, cognition, memory,
development, attention, etc.) since these experimental
fields are data driven and paradigmatic in their approach.
Thus in general the methodological rigor of the “hard”
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sciences was influenced more by the growth of new
knowledge and new technologies than by the social
unrest.
As said, in the 60s and 70s scientific knowledge was
expanding at an exponential pace, and, as new subfields
emerged, there was a large increase in the number of
research articles being written (as in the humanities).
Consequently, traditional journals, whose editors were
conservative and committed to the past, were overwhelmed, and scholarly societies felt strong pressure to
provide more venues for publication. This was partially
solved by subdividing journals into topics (e.g., in 1970
Physical Review was broken into nuclear physics, particles and fields, general physics, and solid states; Journal
of Experimental Psychology [1916] was split into animal
behavior [1976], general [1976], human learning and
memory [1976], human perception and performance
[1976], learning, memory, and cognition [1982], and applied [1996]). Of course, many new journals were
founded as well (e.g., Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 1981; Cognitive Neuropsychology, 1984;
Theory and Psychology, 1991). Other solutions for increasing the “bandwidth” were to publish more issues
per year and to opt for a two-column, larger page with
smaller type.
New publications also appeared in the hard sciences,
where novel kinds of interdisciplinary research (e.g., genetics) required new interdisciplinary publications (e.g.,
Molecular Biology and Evolution, 1983; Methods in
Organic Synthesis, 1984). Parallel developments in psychology saw the advent of information processing (and
later informatics), artificial intelligence, personal computers, the high-tech fields of cognitive science, and
eventually cognitive neuroscience.
Music Cognition

As in the humanities, there was some irritation by music
psychologists that psychology as a whole had prioritized
the studies of language and vision and largely ignored
the topic of music (which to some extent is still the case
today). It was into this milieu that Diana Deutsch
launched the interdisciplinary journal Music Perception
in 1982. But as we saw, the establishment of a new journal was not unusual at the time. Psychomusicology, whose
founders included scholars from both music and psychology departments, appeared in 1981, one year before
Music Perception, and the British journal Psychology of
Music, which had a strong bent toward educational psychology, had existed since 1973. The point is, a critical
mass of psychologists collectively yearned to push music
cognition into prominence.
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The argument behind this thrust was that that study
of music opens a window onto psychological processing
like no other art form. Music is primarily a temporal art,
with inherently mathematical properties of time and
space (intervallic and durational ratios; pitch height, registral direction, return of pitch frequencies; meters on
many levels, etc.). Yet perceptual experiences swirl constantly, like the blades of a windmill (see Figure 1).
Theories of music cognition bring this windmill into
focus, providing a shuttered lens that models the whole
gamut of the temporal human experience, from psychophysical stimuli to mapping our deepest emotions.
Such musical snapshots of this experiential temporal
swirl have the potential to fan outward, informing every
aspect of psychological processing. This is the importance—and the challenge—of our field.
It was clear from the beginning that Music Perception
was to be an international journal, and Deutsch worked
hard to include European and Asian scientists (in the East
the chief participants have been the Japanese, the Koreans,
and the Australians). But the unusual philosophy of Music
Perception was its commitment to interdisciplinary research. The very earliest issues made this clear, where articles by music theorists (Benjamin, Brown, Bruner,
Butler, Erickson, Narmour, Lerdahl, Lewin, Thomson,
Walsh, and others) and linguists (Chen, Jackendoff, Keiler,
Steedman, and others) appeared alongside those by psychologists. In addition, Deutsch’s acceptance of interdisciplinarity encouraged psychologists and music theorists
to collaborate, and over the years many such co-authored
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FIGURE 1. The shuttered lens behind the windmill (see text).

articles have appeared (e.g., by Butler and Ward, Eitan
and Timmers, Krumhansl and Lerdahl, Narmour and
Rosner, Meyer and Rosner, Parncutt and Bregman, Repp
and London and Keller, and others). Music theorists also
began to publish their own experiments in the journal.
Music Perception was thus always meant to be a mixture
of theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of
music (I will discuss the importance of music theory to
the interdiscipline later).
The use of the word “perception” in the title of the
journal made the point that, even though cognition was
then the dominant approach, the areas of perception,
psychophysics, and acoustics were not to be left behind.
In other words, Deutsch was something of a maverick
with respect to the cognitive revolution (Cognition was
first published in 1972). Yet from the beginning the articles in the journal cast a wide net—from biology to
bells to art to medicine and beyond, even as cognition
swept over the field of psychology from the 1960s onward—following the rejection of positivist Skinnerian
behaviorism and the codification and incorporation of
Gestalt principles into the mainstream.
When Deutsch stepped down as editor in 1995, the high
quality of the journal continued unabated under the leadership of Jamshed Bharucha (1995-98), Robert Gjerdingen
(1998-2002), and Lola Cuddy (2002 to the present).
Particularly noteworthy in the past fifteen years or so has
been the broadening of subject matter to include research
in the perception of musical time, musical emotion, and
musical performance along with, perhaps, an increase in
use of patterned and contextualized musical stimuli which
are thought to be more “ecologically valid” (see Figure 2
in Tirovolas & Levitin, 2011). And in 2005 under Cuddy’s
supervision, the journal underwent a complete makeover
in format with double columns and more issues per year
to accommodate the growing rate of submissions. In the
world of science publications Music Perception has thus
achieved more visibility than ever before.
The prophetic music books on psychology in the 1950s,
60s, and 70s—for example, those of Meyer (1956; for a
recent scholarly appreciation of Meyer, see the entire first
issue of Musica Humana, 2009), Francès (1958/1988),
Fraisse (1956), Roederer, (1973), Plomp (1976), Davies
(1978), Critchley & Henson (1977), and Pierce (1983)—
begged for a collection of expert essays summarizing the
latest research, which Deutsch’s (1982) path-breaking volume more than met (a second, new volume with fresh
articles followed in 1999; a third is in preparation).
After 1982, a cascade of edited volumes of scholarly
essays flooded the market (see Table 1). Numerous textbooks augmented these scholarly essays at the undergraduate level (e.g., Butler, 1992; Dowling and Harwood,
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TABLE 1. Chronological Listing of Edited Essay Volumes Published
During the Rapid Rise of Music Cognition as an Independent Discipline.

Deutsch, (1982)
Bruhn, Oeter, & Roesing (1985)
Howell, Cross, & West (1985)
Gabrielssohn (1987)
Sloboda (1988)
McAdams & Deliège (1989)
Howell, West, & Cross (1991)
Jones & Holleran (1992)
McAdams & Bigand (1993)
Aiello (1994)

1986; Hargreaves, 1986; Sloboda, 1985, and others).
During the same period, a number of music-theoretic
books specifically directed toward music psychology
shaped the field (e.g., Gjerdingen, 1988; Lerdahl &
Jackendoff, 1983; Narmour, 1990, 1992; Parncutt, 1989).
Solo books by scientists were also a regular and important occurrence (e.g., Krumhansl, 1990; Serafine, 1988;
Sundberg, 1987). Diana Deutsch formed SMPC in 1990,
and the first meeting was held in 1992 (at the second
ICMPC). By then music psychology had clearly become
an independent research area and had achieved status as
an interdisciplinary subject throughout the academic
world.
Much more could be said about the many scholars
who contributed to its rise, but I need not recount that
history because it has been dealt with elsewhere (see
Cohen, 2009; Cross, 1998; Gjerdingen, 2002; Hallam,
Cross, & Thaut, 2009; Huron, 1999, and many
others).
By the mid-1980s music theorists had gained access to
the voluminous amount of empirical work being done
in music psychology. Musicians could now efficiently
examine the discipline’s methodologies and experimental designs along with glimpsing into the specialized
bibliographies of psychophysics, perception, cognition,
development, attention, and memory. Music theorists
also became aware of comparative psychology in areas
such as language, vision, and animal behavior. And not
a moment too soon: for looming just around the corner
was the juggernaut of cognitive neuroscience, which
would eventually take a strong interest in music.
Part 2
Music Theory as an Independent Discipline

Although tonal systems (learned pitch hierarchies) have
dominated pitched music for thousands of years (and
continue to typify what most people listen to), twentieth-
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century audiences had to confront many new systems
of composing that suspended, avoided, weakened, or
suppressed tonality altogether. There were many reasons for this revolution, rejection, whatever one wishes
to call it. In twentieth-century music (whose early innovators were Debussy, Schoenberg, Bartók, and
Stravinsky), it appears that these composers were rebelling against the tonal authoritarianism of high romanticism, whose musical ideas seemed to be depleted. In a
political sense, we might historically interpret the compositional desire to overthrow the past—to reject tonal
knowledge as stylistically “played out”—as a musical
protest against the capitalist societies that produced the
carnage of the late nineteenth century, which fulminated into World Wars 1 and 2. As we saw earlier, wars
cause cultural changes in the arts because to some extent the arts model the culture to which they belong.
However, the more direct reason for the rejection of
romantic tonality, up to the tonal minimalism of the
1960s, was to free composers from the stylistic constraints that tonality imposed and from the entrenched
musical traditions that seemed to ignore the momentous
changes taking place in twentieth-century society;
namely, the onslaught of modernism, the hegemony of
scientific reasoning, and the growing wonders (and musical possibilities) of technological innovation.
Following nineteenth-century egoism—that it was
genius and originality that guaranteed historical
greatness—composers of the early twentieth century,
who boldly accepted the new social status quo of
modernist society—thus sought to formulate new
musical identities. If great scientists possessed the innovative creativity to discover new and unanticipated
natural laws, why couldn’t both modern and postmodern composers invent new systems of music?
Given the number of great tonal composers from the
past—whose works were preserved and had dominated concert programming for 150 years—the problem for contemporary composers was crafting an
individualized musical voice, finding new audiences
for that voice, and becoming a new great—one who
invents original and compelling music. Thus, like literature and the visual arts, “serious” music radically
cycled through styles decade by decade (see Morgan,
1992) since every composer wanted to be recognized
and remembered as an innovator.
Traditional tonal theory and analysis were at a complete loss to cope adequately with the blitz of new modernist styles in the twentieth century, such as non-serial
atonality, twelve-tone atonality, integral serialism, experimentalism, indeterminacy, pluralism, minimalism,
electronic music, computer music, and so forth.
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Accordingly, beginning with the early revolutionary
works of Debussy, Ives, Scriabin, Stravinsky, and
Schoenberg, and continuing through the Futurism of the
1910s (Russolo), the neoclassicism of the 20s (Poulenc
et al.), the experimentalism of the 30s and 40s (Cowell,
Cage), the integral serialism of the 50s (Babbitt and
many others), and the minimalism of the 60s (Reich and
many others), new theories had to be constructed and
formulated to unravel these never before imagined musical “languages.” And such theories had to be created
whole cloth because these newly asserted, highly original
styles seemed largely without precedent. That is, unlike
past changes in tonal styles, these new languages did not
gradually evolve, and so exhibited musical content that
was either very high in information or else heard just as
noise. Although much of the new music was directed
toward connoisseurs, increasing numbers of new styles
were imposed on ordinary listeners who found modern
and postmodern music either very demanding, confusing, or altogether unintelligible.
Consequently, composers played a very important part
in constructing the theories of this new music. Given
that music theory had always been shaped by composers,
it was not surprising that many modern composers were
likewise involved in formulating music theory (e.g.,
Schoenberg, Hindemith, Stravinsky, Krenek, Sessions,
Babbitt, Rochberg, Perle, Stockhausen, Boulez, and many
others). Thus composers were directly responsible for
much of the new thinking in music theory.
They even had their own journal, Perspectives of New
Music (established at Princeton University in 1962), which
complemented the Journal of Music Theory (established at
Yale University in 1957). The significance of these publications in shaping the future of music theory as an independent discipline cannot be overestimated (the scholarly
problem for this Princeton-Yale axis at the beginning was
that the field was so small “insider” peer review was common). Together, the two journals defined the subjects,
methods, techniques, and assertiveness of the field, a tone
that probably derived from the myth of the misunderstood, alienated composer of romantic lore, which easily
transferred to music theory: like positivistic musicologists,
music theorists felt isolated and disdained by the American
Musicological Society (AMS).
With so much at stake, the theorists who took up the
cause had to sort out the pitch collections, the synthetic
scales, the non-tertian chords, the new kinds of textures,
the complexes of additive and subtractive rhythms, the
asymmetric meters, and the impact of all these on new
types of formal arrangements, which seemed to be nonorganic and lacking the aesthetic tonal arches that listeners were accustomed to.

By the early 70s, music theory had constructed an
array of new analytical techniques to determine the
structures of these unprecedented works. Because these
theories depended largely on internally consistent logics,
they and the descriptive graphic analyses that they generated were different from anything previously seen in the
history of music theory.
Both traditional and “new” musicologists found these
innovative descriptive theories and their graphic analyses hard to fathom, and, moreover, too many of the
analyses seemed overly technical and thus uniformed by
historical and cultural knowledge (earlier tonal theories
of music relied on roman-numeral analysis and key labeling, which can be learned by first-year undergraduates). As appreciations, these analyses, many of which
were intellectually interesting and analytically enlightening, attempted to validate the new styles through theory
alone, with scant attention paid to the part history or
culture played in such a judgment.
Because the new theory had, it seemed, few precedents
and marshaled new kinds of analytical methodologies
and novel symbologies (e.g., derived from ideological
commitments to Schenkerian theory, set theory, mathematical groups, arrays, combinatorics, and many other
kinds of formalistic descriptions), the editors of traditional musicological journals were generally reluctant to
publish the research articles using these techniques.
Given the pressure to publish in academe, music theorists found this frustrating. A correlated irritation was
the perception that at national conferences of AMS they
felt they were receiving less than their fair share of the
allocated program slots for discussions of recent theory
and innovative analysis.
If the music historians were troubled by the new theory, the new theorists felt that both the old and new musicology devoted too much time to taxonomies of style,
manuscript attributions, social functions, cultural meanings, and social histories with only rudimentary and
unsophisticated attention to the “music itself,” to its
structures, forms, materials, composition, and so forth.
(Furthermore, the “new” musicology had been woefully
negligent in studying the compositional content of “serious” twentieth-century music.)
In short, those interested in analysis and theory and
who were fascinated by contemporary composition were
simply “disinterested in the kinds of activities AMS fostered” (Forte, 2003, paragraph 5). Consequently, music
theorists begin to plan seceding from their parent organization inasmuch as the “very idea of an autonomous
‘field’ of music theory was anathema to many in the
AMS” (Forte, paragraph 4). (It should be noted that
Leonard Meyer, who began his career as a composer, was
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against the split from the beginning because he thought
that theory and analysis would be severely compromised
in the absence of also studying the appropriate historical
contexts.)
In 1977, alienated theorists founded the Society of
Music Theory (SMT), and in 1979 launched the society’s
journal, Music Theory Spectrum (to complement the
Journal of Music Theory, 1957, and the German journal
Musiktheorie, 1979). The British journal Music Analysis
followed in 1982, and France’s Analyse Musicale in 1985
(Music Theory Online appeared in 1993). As in music
psychology, for the first time a plethora of articles about
twentieth-century music qua music saw print, and even
the analysis of tonal music received a more thorough and
rigorous treatment than ever before. Like music cognition, music theory seemed to be a discipline whose time
had come. (For the chronology of SMT’s founding, see
Browne, 1979.)
But after the split, the bad feelings between AMS and
SMT did not dissipate. Postmodern “liberals” took a dim
view of “positivist” music theory which, as a stand-alone
discipline, seemed to churn out pluralistic analytical
“readings” and “feature” descriptions of music scores for
their own sake. Aside from their technical complexity,
such stand-alone analytical articles represented a textual,
logical exegesis of complex musical works. “Ideas”
(Schoenberg, 1950/2010), “imaginary concepts” (Goehr,
2007), or “fictions” (Guck, 1994) were also explored,
which implied the need for imaginative prose interpretations and elaborate analytic graphs to accompany the
elitist musical experiences of the professional analyst.
The postmodernist charge was that such analyses,
however logical, lacked sufficient context (history, culture, society, aesthetics, and cognition) without promise
of connecting to a “larger picture,” and relied too much
on the authority of the printed score, where the music
text was “freeze-framed.” In effect, the score was reduced
to an objective, reified, autonomous thing (Butterfield,
2002) with a determinable, closed structure. (Since the
mid-1990s, many theorists have taken great pains to deal
with these criticisms, and SMT is more open to criticism
and much richer in diverse approaches than it was in the
80s and 90s.)
But at SMT’s inception, music theorists (and the composers that backed the stand-alone analytical enterprise)
were very protective of their turf. They insisted not only
on their right to independence from AMS but also asserted the logical value of “analysis itself ” in producing
isolated analytical “readings” of works with little attention to communicative properties or meanings outside
the analysis itself. Nevertheless, the attacks continued
from the historians (e.g., Kerman, 1980, 1985; Treitler,
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1982) with replies in like kind from the theorists (see,
e.g., Agawu, 1997, 2004). Music theorists felt under siege
at the time (Schmalfeldt, 1998), and SMT hunkered
down to preserve and defend itself against all postmodernists, determined to show AMS members that sophisticated analysis was necessary and that it would survive,
flourish, and in time validate itself (for more bibliography and examples of theory’s defense, readers should
consult the first six essays in volume 3 of the 1997 Journal
of Musicology).
Music Theory versus Cognitive Music Theory

I relate this chronology because during the “circling of
the wagons” in the 1980s, an important moment was
missed. Many theorists interested in music cognition,
empirical evidence, scientific method, formalized linguistics, and so forth were also searching for publication outlets. But SMT, with its strong representation of
composers, overlooked music psychology and did not
encourage an interest in it. In the very first issue of
Music Theory Spectrum the editor (Simms, 1979) welcomes “historical studies, contributions to pedagogy
and reflections upon the discipline itself, analyses of a
wide variety, refinements or innovation in analytic
methods, and more speculative statements about musical logic, meaning, and effect.” But there is no hint of
music cognition here. Even twenty years later, aware
that music theory is regarded as “insular, elitist, and
inbred,” a former president of SMT (McCreless, 1998)
makes a case for reaching out to the “sister societies”
(College Music Society, Society for Ethnomusicology,
and AMS), but again, no mention of connecting to
SMPC.
As we have seen, unlike the situation in music theory,
the study of music cognition involved opening up the
field—studying listeners instead of the introspective
analytical judgments of an academic elite. And cognitive
music theorists were not so much interested in the score
(the “text”) as in the perceptual processes and emotional
experiences of ordinary listeners. The questions were,
what exactly does music communicate, and how does it
do so in terms of cognitive processing?
Implicit in music psychology was the skepticism toward logical theories that were incapable of empirical
testing. To cognitive music theorists, many analyses of
the new theory had a rationalistic quality. In the year
SMT was founded, I wrote that theorists “should attempt
to formalize an implication-realization model within the
context of certain psychological theories that bear directly on the problems of perception and structure”
(Narmour, 1977, p. 212). Much later, others (Wiggins,
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Müllensiefen, & Pearce, 2010) echoed this sentiment,
saying that unless music theory is “explicitly informed
by music cognition studies,” it will remain “a figment of
the imagination,” a “kind of folk psychology” (p. 231; see
also Cross, 1988). Of course, “where one draws the line
between, say, fictional objects and set-theoretical structures may well depend on one’s metaphysical convictions” (Frigg & Harman, 2009, section 2).
Those in music cognition, who moved beyond the encircled perimeter of SMT, became outsiders overnight.
Cognitive music theorists, however, felt little need to
challenge either the postmodernist status quo of AMS
or the positivistic status quo of music theory. With the
open policy of Music Perception, and all the burgeoning
publications preceding and following the establishment
of the journal, they were welcomed into music cognition,
which by this time was in full bloom (the Society for
Music Perception and Cognition was established shortly
thereafter).
Now there are national organizations dedicated to
music cognition in six countries—Korea, Japan, Australia,
Europe, Argentina, Canada, and the U.S. (the SMPC
website lists 49 labs dedicated to auditory perception and
music cognition). ESCOM was formed in 1990, and its
journal, Musicae Scientiae, came out in 1997. Today, in
distinguished institutions in both the United States and
Canada, there are faculty in music departments whose
research lies mostly in music cognition. And, somewhat
ironically, as of this writing, one of the largest study
groups in SMT consists of theorists interested in music
cognition. In sum, music cognition is here to stay.
Table 2 summarizes the discussion thus far. Let me
now, however, contrast a number of the differences between “outsider” cognitive approaches to music theory
and the practices “inside” current music theory. We recall
that Music Perception was to be an interdisciplinary journal (also emphasized by Mari Riess Jones in her 2004

presidential address to SMPC); so it is important to list
what the general disciplinary differences between cognitive music theory and music theory are.
Of course, no one is in complete agreement about
what music theory is (see the variety of essays in Broman
& Engebretsen, 2007). But it is clear that since its founding, traditional music theory has remained focused on
composers, composing, on specific compositions (criticism), and on the styles and materials of music. Major
concerns in this respect are a work’s “motivation,” its
unique style of composition (parametric interactions,
concatenation of techniques, etc.), and its multi-leveled
structuring. But as discussed, a given analysis in traditional music theory is primarily introspective and phenomenological and interposes the analytical “reading”
between the listener and the hearing of the score. The
goal of such analysis is thus to mediate, explain, and elucidate the score for those who wish to purvey its meaning
through the theorist’s personal experience, understanding, description, and evaluation.
These personal interpretations are to reveal the analyst’s “deeper sense” of the text in order to enhance others’ appreciation of the work (Temperley, 1999). Such
analytical practice is obviously conservative. A perfect
example is Schenker’s view that only through his theory
can people hear and understand the long-range coherence of the great German works of tonal art (see
Snarrenberg, 1997; Cook, 1990, regards Schenker’s view
as just metaphoric). Modeled again after textual analysis
in literature, such logical exegeses are typical of the composer/score approach.
Historically, pedagogy and “appreciations” have, of
course, always been a central concern of music theory.
In schools of music, analytical coursework has always
attempted to explain how sophisticated music is written,
how it is structured, and by extension how one can learn
the grammatical rules to write convincing musical

TABLE 2. Four Related Fields, Comparing What Each Doubts (= Rejects) and Trusts (= Embraces).

Fields:

Music Cognition

Cognitive
Music Theory

Music Theory

Musicology

doubts

mechanistic, “positivistic”
Watsonian-Skinnerian
behaviorism

trusts

the cognitive revolution,
music theory, linguistics, all
subjects of psychology

rationalistic music theory
without a convincing
psychological foundation
music cognition, experimental methodology, perception and
emotion of ordinary
listeners

postmodernism’s antipositivist critique of
music theory; extent of
psychology’s relevance
stand-alone music-theory,
concentration on logical analysis, elitist score
“readings,” and their
relevance to theory
pedagogy

“positivistic” musicology;
“positivistic” music
theory, “positivistic”
experiments
postpositivism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, social
& intellectual history,
cultural studies, cultural
anthropology
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“forgeries” of a given style. Such “exegetical” analyses
dominate theory textbooks at both the undergraduate
and graduate levels.
However, music theory was never just about improving
theory pedagogy but rather about revealing the creativity
of past masters to give musicians the analytical tools to
study great works, to provide music criticism with a library of “close readings,” to explain a musical work’s unity
(or at least its consistency), and to furnish culture with
aesthetic rationales to valorize musical artworks. Even
style studies by themselves were ultimately designed to
function as prisms for elucidating individual artworks and
illuminating the composer’s unique accomplishments.
In contrast, cognitive theorists are fascinated with how
experienced and inexperienced listeners prospectively
perceive and comprehend music’s emotional affects and
intellectual stimulations. In addition, they take a strong
interest in explanations of common behavior and natural learning rather than in the individualized, denaturalized, exegetical analyses of music. Indeed, cognitive
theorists claim that much of what current analysis accepts is not cognitively feasible, despite the degree of
logic. That is, it goes against inborn processing systems
that cannot be switched off.
To explain: cognitive impingements exercise a tremendous constraint on remembering long-term relationships,
and much of what current analysis produces is
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problematic in terms of the limitations of both attention
and working memory. Moreover, many analyses violate
what is known about the psychological principles of
grouping (chief among these are the far-fetched mappings of linear patterns in tonal music and the bracketing (or encircling) of non-parametrically equivalent sets
in the analysis of contemporary music). In short, the less
cognitive, the more rationalistic, and the more personal
analyses are, the more dependent their value is on the
metaphysical beliefs of like-minded analysts.
Tables 3–4 summarize some basic and generalized differences between music theory and cognitive music
theory. Table 5 shows some of the focal differences and
similarities, Table 6 the different attitudes toward listening, and Table 7 some differences in outcomes. Although
the dualistic descriptions in these tables are “essential
half-truths” (after O’Brien, 1998), they are useful in
sharpening our views about the different though interrelated connections between the two fields.
Given that the music theorist’s retrospective study of
composition, the score, and the value of expert academic
“readings” has historically and pedagogically been of
obvious value, we might ask, how does music cognition
deal with the topic of analytical criticism and the legacy
of a great composer? How does it, in vouching for the
experiences of ordinary listeners, account for the extraordinary listening of great composers? The answer is

TABLE 3. Some Basic Differences Between the Two Fields.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
subject matter: how music is composed, structured, and
functions as an art form
the score as a complex historical text containing multiple
interpretations, some of which are purely imaginative
focus is on composers and composing
ideas with experimental possibilities are of little or no concern

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
subject matter: how music exemplifies basic psychological
processing
the score as a partial but variable formalization, a recipe, or
a set of instructions
focus is on perception, cognition, and experimental design
emphasis on hypotheses that can be experimentally tested

TABLE 4. Some Generalized Differences Between the Two Fields.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
main preoccupation: analysis of score
analysis: largely retrospective (retrodictive) and relativistic
memory and attention are an afterthought
deep structural knowledge of the musical repertory
modus operandi: logical, rationalistic, theory driven,
introspective, personal connoisseurship
metaphysical grounding: belief
chief mode of explanation: word

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
main preoccupation: analysis of data
analysis: largely prospective (predictive) and reductionist
memory and attention are always considered
shallow structural knowledge of the musical repertory
modus operandi: empirical, data driven; hypotheses must
be replicable by others
metaphysical grounding: behavior
chief mode of explanation: number
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TABLE 5. Focal Differences and Similarities.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
high-level structure of central concern
details valorized as individualized properties of artworks and
essential to the phenomenological experience of the analyst
generally more interested in aesthetics, ideas, imagination, “fictions,” myths, and narrativity than in psychological emotions

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
manifest structure of main concern
experience modeled but with individualized details classified as outliers or anomalies; generalizing the aesthetic
experience
more interested in arousal, emotion, affect, feeling, mood,
than in aesthetic philosophizing of any sort

TABLE 6. Attitudes Toward Listening.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
listening assumption: professional or expert attention by a
sophisticated academic elite
humanistic stance: existential, personal “reading”; autobiographical stance; egoism analytically maximized
musical development of listening not an issue (analysis by
and for a academic elite)

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
listening assumption: variable attention expected from a
subject sample of ordinary listeners
scientific stance: social, population response (contagion);
sense of self minimized so as not to influence data
development a major issue (experts vs. novices; trained vs.
untrained; old vs. young)

TABLE 7. Different Outcomes.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
explanations: formal, phenomenological, heuristic, etc.; relying
on technical, insider vocabularies
interpretations: semantic, symbolic, representative, reductive
written work organized by approaches, theses, topics, and
themes
published work: a humanistic form of literature, criticism,
or essay; based largely on semantic and logical reasoning

that a significant proportion of any composer’s musical
processing is the same as that of the ordinary listener. To
compose is simultaneously to listen and to perform in
one’s head. When a motive, passage, or phrase is sketched,
the composer constantly critiques the compositional
decisions by reentering the creative domain of the performer and the cognitive constructions of the listener.
Among their many motivations for writing music,
great composers are first and foremost great listeners
who gradually acquire deep psychological insights into
producing human emotions and affects. They also capture the auditory human intellect with impressive sonic
precision. This is what cognitive music theorists study,
and it is a propitious way to take up the issues of analysis and criticism as regards the perceptual—rather than
the compositional—experience.

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
explanations: perceptual, cognitive, developmental, etc.;
relying on technical, scientific vocabularies
interpretations: statistical, mathematical, graphic, numerically weighted
written work organized by testable hypotheses and data
analysis
published work: a scientific form of literature; based largely
on empirical argument and numerical data

Part 3
Theories, Maps, and Models: Analogical Thinking

Humanists and scientists employ four different strategies
to map or model the world, depending on the circumstances that confront them: (1) through belief (e.g., a
cultural ideology), (2) through logic (as in mathematics
or other rigorously systematic thinking), (3) through empirical evidence (as in duplicated, controlled experiences),
or most commonly (4) through a varied invocation of all
three modes simultaneously. Because humans are social
creatures, all theories are in some nontrivial sense culturally conditioned. We cannot avoid having our beliefs
creep into the creation of our knowledge (Poovey, 1998).
This is why we have such trouble objectively evaluating
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In that connection, now consider the importance of
modeling and mapping to theory-making (see Figure 2).
Models and maps are highly defined research programs
representing the theories to which they are attached
(Frigg & Hartmann, 2009). Such theories can be logically
or empirically driven (or both). Without models, theories lack the specificity to become operational with respect to their targeted research goals. In an important
sense a model or a map interprets—which is to say explains and fills in—the correlated theory’s formalized
properties in terms of the phenomenological content
that the theory is designed to explain. But the content of
a model or a map is rarely identical or completely isomorphic to the abstract properties of the theory that
comprises it. Yet it is not entirely independent either.
Rather, the modeled or mapped content complements
the theory.
Models and maps are thus less complete and more
tentative than theories. This is why I call the theory the
“implication-realization model”: its target of study is
mostly melody, although I have claimed (Narmour 1990,
THEORIES
top down
abstract
constructed
formalized
complex
multipartite
hierarchical

PHENOMENA
(Explanatory
Targets)
(not isomorphic)

(not isomorphic)

and choosing between alternative theories with more or
less equal weight: inherent cultural relativity cannot be
objectively falsified (Kuhn, 1962; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).
This means that facts are not pure; they are neither valuefree nor theory-free, and social processes are always implicated in their discovery (or their theoretical invention).
The relationship between experienced fact and empirical observation is mediated by discursive interpretation, and such interpretation, if it rises to the level
of explanation, is itself mediated by theoretical construction. Theory-building feeds off empiricism, and
empirical analysis derives equal value from theory.
The tension between theory and empirical data constitutes the epistemological problem of knowledge.
Sometimes this can be resolved by tweaking the logic
of the theory or sometimes by gathering more (or different) empirical data. But a perfect solution is never
possible.
Theory is a used and abused word with a thousand
meanings, from the hazy mappings in the arts and
humanities (theses, themes, approaches, programs,
positivistic methods) to various kinds of partially
representational models that provide a psychological
perspective on reality (Giere, 1999) to the precise
theories employed in the physical and mathematical
sciences (very clear axioms, definitions, hierarchical
propositions, etc.). Although many types of theory
construction exist, the organization of most formalized work is logically similar in its structure and involves a common set of distinctions.
As an example, consider the metatheoretical path chosen to formulate the implication-realization model
(Narmour, 1990, 1992). I began by: (1) listing my intuitive, contemplative, and introspective speculations about
melody; (2) devising postulates, grounds, axioms, and
hypotheses for the theory; (3) making clear definitions
of abstract (theoretical) and concrete terms, properties,
and attributes (those to which people will normally assent); (4) writing a set of hierarchical statements (major
and minor premises) in order to formulate (5) how the
theory’s construction can be systematically operational
in terms of a symbological system and (6) how the theory is to be empirically evaluated in terms of principles,
logical consistency, coherence, and parsimony. Of course,
no matter how careful the initial protocol, such organization says nothing about the ultimate quality of the
theory—(7) its ecological accuracy and scope and (8) its
implicative consequences as regards revealing new
knowledge and formulating new questions.
T hus, we h ave t h e cl as s ic al a t t r ibutes of
theory-construction: conjecture, observation, terms and
sentences, symbological goals, and allowance for empirical testing. Only one thing is missing: analogy.
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becomes operational
provides feedback

interprets
completes
MODELS or MAPS
bottom up
introspective (initiated from personal experience)
rationalistic (certain concepts are privileged)
phenomenological (certain observations asserted as
mental objects, functioning as factual content in the theory)
pragmatic (designed to facilitate the theory)
empirical (if designed to be tested)
often symbological (rule-driven nexus)
implicative (pointing to “downstream” social practice)
FIGURE 2. A hypothesized tripartite conceptualization of research
phenomena vis-à-vis the properties of theories and models or maps.
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1996) that the theory has the potential to deal with all
musical parameters in any style. But that remains to be
modeled (or mapped).
If theories are top-down, post-facto constructions formalizing the applications of their associated models and
maps, then the latter constitute ongoing, incomplete,
bottom-up analogues (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009)—research
programs engaging the manifest, objective content that
defines the ecological subject matter. In some sense, then,
models and maps are always more connected to reality
than theories are. Yet models and maps alone—without
explicit connection to a theory—remain impoverished
and incapable of moving to stage 8 (above). As we have
seen, in both literary and musicological criticism, mappings can be employed with no attached theory whatever.
But such mappings rarely coalesce into an operational
theory by themselves (i.e., theoretical guidelines are always
necessary). Likewise, theories without models or maps
lose their ability to generate new knowledge and to pose
new questions, no matter how rigorously logical or beautifully constructed.
Music theories descriptive of a stylistic domain often involve logical sentences that have positivistic-like predicates
reflecting the style—the “language” to which they apply—
but associated models and maps need not be linguistic in
nature; that is, they may be neither semantic nor syntactic
and yet adequately analogize or represent the targeted phenomena of the research (Frigg & Hartman, 2009).
The best theories are connected to maps and models
via refined analytical symbologies (e.g., the importance
of mathematics in the sciences). Indeed, analytical symbologies form an epistemological nexus between theories
and models by concretizing the analytical space that exists between the theory and its models (or its mappings).
In the absence of symbolic analytical systems to bind
them together, both theories and their models connect
less strongly. Intellectual domains that use models and
maps but lack integrated analytical symbologies thus
tend to produce more tenuous research conclusions.
Through concrete analytical symbols governed by clearly
formulated rules, the power of a top-down theory is liberated, and through concrete analytical symbols,
bottom-up models and maps fill in the gaps of the theory
with precise analogical content.
The analytical symbols of the implication-realization
model are syntactic because they attach directly to the
score (whose relationships, we presume, exhibit cognitively perceptible sequences). This means that the symbols
are minimally reductive because, no matter how accurate
the notation, a highly detailed score itself is already an
idealized reduction of what the composer envisioned. (To
be sure, the model is designed to generate higher reductive
levels as well, but these lack the reality of the manifest

surface of the music.) It is clear, then, that theories, maps,
models, and analytical symbologies are not all of a type.
Together they form complex intellectual creations that in
some sense recapitulate epistemological history.
By themselves, models and maps are part Aristotelian
(or Lockean) in that one initiates their construction by
trying to think from the ground up (item 1 earlier) by
introspecting one’s own perceived experiences. They are
part rationalistic in that they involve believing and privileging certain concepts (2 and 3). They are part phenomenological in that certain observations are asserted
as mental objects and thus function as the factual content of the theory (4). Their properties are logically empirical when the theory is designed to be tested (5). They
are pragmatic (6) in that items 1–5 are purposely designed to be complementary and to allow theory, model,
map, and symbology to work analogically, hand in hand.
And finally, their ultimate value results from “downstream” social practice (7), causing those to whom the
theory is addressed to conceive of the targeted phenomena in new ways and to attend to relationships never
before observed (8). In short, models and maps make the
purpose of a constructed theory clear via its expressed
ontology (nature), epistemology (conceptual basis), and
formalized rule-driven methodology governing the use
of its analytical symbology.
Obviously, most of the ways society bandies about the
word theory falls far short of items 1–6 (the best scientific
and mathematical theories being exceptions). However,
there is an important addendum: no ideal, perfect theory
exists because theories have complex, multiple parts, not
all of which the analogous models or mappings express.
This is because initial introspective protocols of any
theory may turn out to be badly mistaken; the original
choice of grounds may be based on misleading metaphors or myths; early definitions may be false, inaccurate, or incomplete or else require either additional or
fewer distinctions (having been overspecified), and so
forth. As the inevitable contingencies emerge, it becomes
clear that certain theories are more useful than others,
but only to the extent that they carry with them the seeds
of their own improvement—generating anomalies and
untenable facts that have to be taken into account in
order to improve the theory (the unavoidable conclusion
derived from the data as tested by the theory).
Relationships between theory and data are symbiotic.
Experimental work is the feedback system. Many empirical
scientists, it would seem, rarely think about theory. But
theory frames all data collecting, looms behind all data
analysis, and ultimately determines the worth of all data
interpretation. Statistics, after all, is based on theorems and
theoretical laws regarding numbers. Those who use statistics without knowing those theorems and laws do so at their
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peril (e.g., multiple regressions can be misleading if the data
lack homoscedasticity; see Rosner & Narmour, 1992).
Nevertheless, theory is biasing — a pair of blinkers that
can prevent one from seeing contradictions. To change the
metaphor, a theory must be worn like a set of clothes (not
taken by faith as a system of belief). A selected theory may
be appropriate for certain circumstances but not for others. Interpretively modeled empirical data tell theorists
what concepts in the closet are suitable for analytical wear
and which should be left on the hanger.
Yet empirical evidence without theory is also biasing.
What counts in explaining any natural phenomenon
emerges from a point-by-point conversation (or narrative) between theory, model, and analytical symbology,
and this must involve not just the data that support the
theory but also the anomalies that fly in the face of the
analogues and thus contradict the theory, the model, the
analytical symbology, or all of them together.
Music Theory, Cognitive Music Theory, and Cognition

No reasoning is ever completely abstract because experience invades every thought. Likewise, not every experience is entirely relativistic. In the construction of
theories, maps, models, and analytical systems, what
matters depends on the degree of holistic coherence
among the abstract, the empirical, and the relativistic. It
follows that music theory as a logical humanistic discipline and music cognition as a scientific empirical discipline are complementary. Each in its own way has
weaknesses that can only be ameliorated by the strengths
of the other. Table 8 summarizes this. The comparison
shows how each discipline augments the other.
To repeat, this is not to say that music theory and cognitive music theory are not independent. There will always be areas of interest in music cognition that hold no
interest for music theory, and vice versa (Krumhansl,
1995). Working together need not compromise the
authority of either field.
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If the humanities strive to understand the differences
between putative sameness or similarity, and if the sciences attempt to explain the commonalities between
putative behavioral differences, then who deals with the
chasm between these two diametrically opposed worlds?
One answer is cognitive music theory, an interdiscipline
that, at least potentially, can initiate and sustain dialogues
between the two disciplines. Yet because both music
theory and cognitive music theory are young fields,
many practitioners do not seem to recognize their special
calling in the scheme of knowledge production.
As we see, then, the epistemological distance between
humanistic mappings and scientific theories, and thus between music theory and cognitive psychology, is great
(Clarke, 1989; Cross, 1988). Likewise, the explanatory space
between musicology, ethnomusicology, music anthropology, and moment to moment musical emotions is vast, and
larger than ever. And this is where cognitive music theory
steps to the fore. It can bridge the gap in all areas because
cognitive music theorists bestride the two fields, one foot
in psychology and the other in music theory.
From one (modeled) perspective, cognitive music theory functions as a delivery system through which normal
music theory gets uploaded to psychology in an empirically testable package (as in the I-R model) or as a set of
hypotheses needing to be tested (as in the rules of Lerdahl
& Jackendoff’s 1983 model or in Gjerdingen’s 2007 schema
theory of galant music). In its download mode, cognitive
music theorists can identify what is psychologically relevant, useful, and critical toward constructing, correcting,
or refining a music theory. In addition, they can identify
and channel psychological facts that are most relevant to
music analysis and thereby ground music-theoretic observations in perceptual and cognitive reality.
Many perceptual studies have shown how grouping
principles determine everything from motivic salience
to voice streaming (compound melody), and if those
principles are violated, ordinary listeners will simply not
hear the connections (Bregman, 1990). If, for example,

TABLE 8. The Need for Interdisciplines.

Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)

Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)

flaw 1: intuitive, theory-based concepts and definitions may
lack cognitive grounding, ignoring the perceptual reality of
subject matter
flaw 2: analysis can be too subjective with problems of private,
egoist content and unexplained multiplicity (too many events
and tokens to be temporally perceived in a single object)
result: too many disconnected articles; too many specialized
theories; insufficient attempts to formulate unified theories;
output is cognitively implausible

flaw 1: knowledge structures and acquired data may be too
abstract, irrelevant, or trivial to be of cognitive musical
importance
flaw 2: selected data can be rationalistically objective with
inadequate representation (events too few), ignoring the
possibility of other minds and lacking in ecological validity
result: too many disconnected experiments; too many hypotheses; too many theories; too little generalizing about
cognitive unity
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linear patterns lack cognitive reality and are forcibly
mapped onto analytical reductions, they will be misleading regarding unity or coherence (as an example, see
Morgan’s 1992 linear analysis of Webern’s fifth bagatelle,
op. 9, which ignores known grouping principles).
Grouping principles and the processing mechanisms of
attention are inborn and cannot willy-nilly be switched
off unless one adopts a kind of inattentional deafness to
the music. Such denaturalized listening occurs when idiosyncratic, exegetical, expert, elitist analyses disregard
what is known about the perceptual and cognitive principles that govern music. That said, the importance of
music cognition to music analysis does not deny music
theory’s autonomy as a scholarly field inasmuch as generalized psychological explanations lie very distant from
the multidimensional cultural, sociological, political,
aesthetic, and historical concerns of score-centered
music study (as illustrated later in Figure 3).
To take another example, consider the relationship
between structure and memory. Most music analyses are
structuralist-oriented and move hierarchically from
manifest levels to higher-level reductions, or vice versa
(most often generated from a top-down grammar of
some sort). Such structural reductions tend to be correlated with formal junctures, cadences, and keys—the
assumption being that these “structural points” are what
sophisticated music listeners store in long-term memory
to enable the recognition, the rehearing, or the processing of other works with similar stylistic sequences.
However, there is convincing evidence to show that
listeners also remember emotional peaks and emotional
endings (see Rozin, Rozin, & Goldberg, 2004). What this
means in terms of memory is that any theory that deals
with only the structural aspects of a work provides only
half an analysis, ignoring altogether the remembered affective structuring. In order to capture both the remembered structure and the remembered affect of a musical
work, analysts need to construct a simultaneously running analysis of both, showing how syntactical structure
and affective structure complement, reinforce, and
deform each other.
Part 4
The Potential of Cognition and Music Theory in
Understanding the Arts

In the Old Schools quadrangle of the Bodleian Library at
Oxford University, the upper stones on each side bear
inscriptions of the medieval quadrivium (namely,
mathematics [or arithmetic], astronomy, geometry, and
music) and the trivium (grammar, logic [dialectica or
debate], and rhetoric). These stones tell us that in the

early 1600s music was still regarded as part of mathematical science as defined by the Pythagoreans (proportion,
measurement, interval, ratio, degree of consonance, and
structure of the universe, i.e., the musical harmony of the
spheres). Of course, we do not think of music this way
now (the textualists would say that music is a form of
rhetoric). Nonetheless, it is inspiring to think that music
study once occupied a lofty scientific position, as opposed to today where music is regarded solely as an art.
But as I will explain, music study should occupy an exalted position in the humanities and in psychology.
In modern universities there is a new trivium in place:
the humanities, the social sciences, and the sciences (see
Figure 3). Encircling this is the postmodern quadrivium,
where religion (belief systems, faith systems, ideologies)
and philosophy (metaphysical interpretation) arch over
the humanities on one side, and where mathematics and
psychology envelop the physical sciences on the other (recall that the sciences are cultural constructs and thus
partly psychological). By philosophy I mean the discipline
that arbitrates metaphysical interpretations, disputes, and
explanations in and between all fields. Mathematics in
Figure 3 includes not only the ordinary definitions of the
subject but also formalized logical systems of all kinds that
map more or less perfectly onto experience.
The disposition of religion needs more explanation.
By it I do not mean just organized religion as practiced
by its believers, but religion as a system of propositional,
metaphysical, structured, and operational beliefs apart
from its social, political, anthropological, and economic
manifestations. There is no question that all research
concepts, whether scientific or humanistic, entail a complex system of structured propositions. In this broad
sense, we may even regard ideologies as a kind of secular
religion (agnosticism, mysticism, and myth also characterize belief systems).
Because human knowledge will always remain incomplete, we will never rid ourselves of metaphysics, religions, faith systems, beliefs, and ideologies, and because
of that, we must scrutinize practices concerning such
propositions for whatever biases they marshal against
the acquisition of logical and empirical knowledge
(hence their position in the outer ring of Figure 3 as
serious subjects of study). Belief systems arise on every
level because all natural and social phenomena are inherently resistant to a complete and detailed logical or empirical mapping or modeling. Because knowledge is a
social construct, as postmodernism has taught us, empirical work is thus always associated with belief(s) and
propositional system(s). The use of the words mapping
or modeling reminds us of the limitations of logical and
empirical theories vis-à-vis whatever proportion of
propositional belief that such metaphors entail.
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Psychology lies at an outer ring of the new quadrivium
because all written knowledge, whether scientific or humanistic, is a product of the human mind. Lying below are
the rest of the humanities, the sciences, and the social sciences, the latter of which are partially humanistic (e.g., case
studies, political history) and partially scientific (demography, economics). Below this ring we find the professional
schools. Diagrams such as this, of course, are simply another example of constructive thinking that enables us to
understand what is, after all, one of the most complex social
entities ever conceived—the modern research university.
The general organization of Figure 3 is thus not definitive or deterministic but rather suggestive and imaginative. The nested circles, which are purely organizational

and not closed, are meant to be read across different
angles of radii and evaluated in terms of nested circumferences. That is, any one subject can radiate throughout
the diagram but can also travel around any given circle
(e.g., language). These circles thus do not contain their
subject matter because, as we all know, the modern
university is a vast heterarchy, where interdisciplinary
cross-cutting and networking are the norm.
The figure’s visual rhetoric is purposely meant to pay
homage to those iconographical medieval drawings of
circles within circles, which tied human activities to the
cosmological scheme of things, except here, of course,
my cartography attempts to emphasize the radiating correlations throughout all human knowledge-seeking.
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At the center of the wheel are “human interests,” the usual
elements without which human life is not conceivable (shelter, food, water, clothing, craft, play, art). In any civilized society these human concerns radiate outward and evolve into
areas of study, education, and research. Figure 3 shows these
as spokes, which articulate areas of study as we move from
the mundane center toward the outer rings.
The geometrically progressive spoke, which expands
outward, is where craft, play, and art (at the edge of the
core) recruit each of our sensorial systems, developing
and channeling them into the various aesthetic productions (and ultimately into games and sports). All these
become academic areas in the modern university. As a
form of adult play, observe that the performing arts meld
into one ongoing progression from dance to ice-skating
to gymnastics to competitive sports (at many institutions, athletics is also studied as a business). Notice also
that language per se is a dominant activity (having its
own spoke; note that writing sits astride, as most of the
world’s people are illiterate).
In the intellectual scheme of Figure 3 music might
seem to be a minor activity (note its small size relative
to language). However, as we have seen, music and the
arts lie at the very core of what it means to be human
inasmuch as they model our life experiences and make
us more emotionally fit (Dissanayake, 1988) to live
meaningfully. Indeed, all the arts are not peripheral but
core activities radiating outward to the upper circles.
Note that music history sits not at the core, where music
theory resides, but higher up, in ring three above the
applied schools (hence the huge space between musicology and the study of musical emotions at the core).
As we see, in this projection, psychology and mathematics operate at a magisterial level, informing all human
thought. Along with religion and philosophy, they coreign over the academic enterprise. Yet neither the outer
ring nor the core dominates the circle. Rather, the areas
in-between—all those subjects encompassed by the
modern trivium—bind the core to the quadrivium, as
gravity binds the universe.
The academic world is psychology’s oyster because it
spans from neurobiology to sociology and has, since its beginning, purveyed the sciences, the social sciences, the humanities, and the arts in all their manifestations.There is no
part of Figure 3 that psychology has not studied, influenced,
informed, and interpreted. After all, everything humans do
is, in some profound sense, psychological, and that includes
all the core intellectual and artistic activities that engage us.
Such envelopment could hardly be otherwise because the
scholarly and research worlds that we create are psychological human constructs. Psychology thus impinges on
every aspect of human life and on all human knowledgeseeking (how could it be otherwise?).

Although still a young field, psychology is thus not just
another science. Its purview over all human activities
(and thus all academic disciplines) is pervasive, and consequently it belongs at the outer ring, along with mathematics, religion (of which it was once a part), and
philosophy (of which it was also once a part).
In contrast, music is essentially a moment to moment
core experience. To the engaged listener it is processed
on the manifest level—the level of emotion, affect,
arousal, mood, feeling, sentiment, and unanticipated
intellectual insights into the temporal domain. Music
theory deals with these moments by attempting to understand music’s materials, functions, structures, and
stylistic and artistic musical instantiations.
But as a core experience (near the basic elements necessary to life), there is a large gap between music theory
and the psychology of emotion—a gap, however, as we
have seen, that can be effectively bridged by cognitive
music theory.
Figure 4 illustrates this. The point here is that in connecting music theory to psychology via cognitive music
theory, psychology releases music theory’s potential by
grounding it as an intellectual discipline and by directing
music upward to the postmodern quadrivium (the outer
circle). As recompense, music theory repays the favor by
affording psychology genuine, ecological musical content with which to experiment. Both psychology and
music theory are dependent on cognitive music theory
in order to draw a complete map of, or to model, the
musical experience. Hence music cognition shows how
psychology can imaginatively and advantageously unite
with music theory, and vice versa.
Because of the numerical nature of music (scales, intervals, ratios, meter, etc.) and because music already has
an elaborate and sophisticated symbology, music theory
and cognitive music theory can model how the other arts
and letters might connect to cognition. What is needed
are more cognitive theorists of literature, cognitive theorists of the fine arts, cognitive theorists of film, and cognitive theorists of dance. In the long run the whole
research enterprise of the humanities cannot be divorced
from psychology. The humanities need grounding in
cognition no less than music theory. Furthermore, the
need is mutual: psychology needs enrichment from the
experiences that model moment by moment human
emotions at the core.
As psychology continues to mature, to consolidate its
research programs, and to unify its theories, and as neuroscience reveals more and more about how our brains
work, both sciences will come to rely more on learning
what the content of music, literature, and the arts is,
without which psychological laws and brain research will
remain general in nature, lacking the real-world of

mundane
world
(core)

SOUND
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[music as an art]
Music Theory

Cognitive
Music
Theory

Psychology

FIGURE 4. The gap between the mundane world with its musical core
(as studied in music theory) and the elevated and remote level of psychology (as mediated by cognitive music theory).
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What are called for are new programs for interdisciplinary Ph.D.’s and more appointments of interdisciplinary
faculty. Theory in the arts and letters is too sophisticated
for psychologists to dabble in, just as the field of psychology is too complex for faculty in arts and letters to play at.
Music Perception, Musicae Scientiae, SMPC, and ESCOM
have blazed the way in this regard and can serve as a model
for the future of interdisciplinary education, provided
cognitive music theorists continue to contribute to this
journal as theorists (rather than just as experimentalists)
and provided they remain essential to the public discourse
of cognitive psychology.
Current work in cognitive music psychology has
taught us much about the specialized psychological processes that are unique to music and also about the generalized processes that music recruits and utilizes from
other cognitive domains (such as language). What we
should not overlook, however, is the unique potential of
collaborative scientific work in music to uncover previously unknown foundational principles in psychology.
That music psychology has the potential to lead music
theory and cognitive music theory to new insights is indisputable. This can best be realized if music cognition,
music theory, and cognitive music theory work together
toward creating unified theories.
Author Note

human emotion and concrete human intellect. As stated
earlier, this does not mean that the humanities or the arts
will become reduced to what is known only in psychology or neuroscience.
What I am arguing here is a permanent link between
the artistic core and the outer ring without the subjugation of one to the other. In other words, I am saying that
music as an academic subject must reclaim its former lofty
status held from Pythagorean times to the high Renaissance
by reconnecting to the science of psychology. Music theory
and cognitive music theory have the potential to bridge
the ontological span that separates them from musicology,
ethnomusicology, and music anthropology.

Portions of this article came from “Inside and Outside
Music Theory,” a lecture given on June 26, 2009 at a
summer institute on Music and the Mind sponsored by
the Institute for Advanced Studies in Music Theory,
Mannes School of Music, New School, New York City. I
am grateful to David Balamuth, Lola Cuddy, Daniel
Levitin, and Alexander Rozin for ideas, criticisms, and
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for his close reading of the manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eugene Narmour, 306 Joseph’s Way, Media, PA
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